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The major goals of this study were (1) to show how physicians as pro-
viders of inputs affect the productivity of other providers in the health
sector; (2) to examine the role of the physician as proxy demander for
the patient of other inputs into the treatment process, especially those
inputs for which the physician himself bears no outlay cost; (3) to indi-
cate whether or how the physician as provider of advice on states of
health and on the productivity of care affects the demand for his own
and other inputs. In this chapter I will summarize the answers to each
of these questions and relate them to issues of public policy.
Physicians as Providers of Inputs
The results in chapter 3 indicate that the level of physician input may
have important effects on measured hospital productivity. Put another
way, if one does not take differences in physician input into account,
hospitals may exhibit relatively large and inexplicable differences in
productivity. Since costliness is just the obverse of productivity, it fol-
lows that if the level of physician input does vary across hospitals, some
of observed variation in hospital costs across such hospitals may in fact
reflect the level of physician input.
Hospitals do vary fairly extensively in such measures of cost as cost
per case and cost per patient-day. Often the mere magnitude of this
variation is used as evidence for the proposition that hospitals are typi-
cally inefficient enterprises: if some have low costs, but others high costs,
then the high cost hospitals must be behaving in an inefficient way. This
is not, of course, all there is to the matter of inefficiency: hospitals
could have virtually identical costs, and still be equally inefficient. Never-
theless, many of the mechanisms proposed for incentive reimbursement
of hospitals involve comparison of hospital costs, either across hospitals
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or over time. This implies that "objective" determinants of the level of
cost—things which are in some sense not the fault of the hospital, or
not properly labelled as inefficiencies—should be adjusted for before the
comparisons are made. Traditional candidates for such adjustments are
such things as casemix, teaching status, and so on. Some other potential
adjustments such as length of stay or service intensity are more ques-
tionable. But the implication of the results of chapter 3 is that there is
another candidate for inclusion in the first list: the level of physician
input, or proxies for it.
If the level of physician input is not controlled for in reimbursement
formulas, some potentially severe biases and inefficiencies can be intro-
duced. Hospitals with high levels of physician input will be rewarded,
and ones with low levels of physician input punished. If the level of
physician input is wholly exogenous and random, in the short run this
will simply mean a capricious distribution of largesse. In the longer run,
some hospitals, those with large amounts of physician input, may have
surplus funds, while those with small amounts will suffer deficits. The
latter will presumably go out of business or contract, while the former
will expand.
Since I showed that hospitals, on average, use relatively too little
physician input, the immediate impact of this development may be bene-
ficial, since output will be concentrated in those hospitals with close to
the ideal ratio of physicians to hospital inputs. If, however, the hospitals
with too few physicians remain in business, even this beneficial outcome
is uncertain. Some physicians will be likely to leave such hospitals,
making the ratios even worse than before. Eventually some output may
be produced at lower cost than before, but other output may be produced
at higher cost. What is relevant, of course, is not average cost, but mar-
ginal cost.
The primary difficulty, however, is that there is no reason to expect
this process to stop once the ideal ratio is approximated. Instead, it will
continue up to the maximum technological limit of substitution of physi-
cian input for other hospital input. In effect, by transferring costs to
physicians' inputs (even if physicians are fully reimbursed), a hospital
can appear to be efficient, and it will therefore be rewarded and survive.
A hospital that cannot or will not transfer costs will shrink or disappear.
Since the process only looks at the hospital's cost, not the total cost,
there is no reason to expect that it will achieve a solution which mini-
mizes total cost. Indeed, it will be likely to transfer to physicians activ-
ities which cost more when performed by physicians in their offices, but
which nevertheless lower hospital costs.
In summary, given the caveat about the relationship of marginal and
average costs, reimbursement mechanisms based on efficient cost levels
rather than actual costs can improve the efficiency of the hospital sector.
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based on the proper measure of costs. One such component which is not
included in hospital budgets, but which deserves emphasis, is the level of
physician inputs. What is relevant is the total cost of hospitalization,
including the physician input; this is the cost on which reimbursement
should be based if an efficient outcome is to be achieved.
Physicians as Proxy Demanders
The physician serves as a surrogate demander for the patient in
choosing the level of inputs to produce health. It is sometimes argued
in the literature that under fee-for-service the physician has no incentive
to choose the cost minimizing combination of those outputs for which
he does not pay directly. Since some of those inputs, such as hospital
care or prescription drugs, are a large proportion of total cost, often
larger than the doctor's bill, it is argued that such inefficiency can be
severe. To avoid it, some method which makes the physician directly
liable for the costs of all inputs, such as prepaid group practice, is often
suggested.
Most of this analysis is conceptual; what empirical evidence there is
is often anecdotal or confounds the measurement of cost minimization
for a given level of health or well-being with that of the level of health
or well-being achieved. I do not wish add to the store of anecdotes on
this subject, but rather show that, at least at the conceptual level, the
argument is invalid if the physician is an income maximizer and is free
to adjust the price he charges for his own services. In such a case, the
physician will not order a high-cost input where a low-cost input would
do just as well. For if he were to do so, the amount he could collect for
his own services would be less. The physician may not act as his patients'
agent in choosing the level of health or well-being, but he will act as
such an agent in choosing the level of other inputs for a given level of
health.
What then of the anecdotes? I offer two possible explanations for the
possibility that physicians do not cost minimize. One is that they are not
really income maximizers, a proposition for which there is ample em-
pirical evidence. But this is a problem of objective functions, not incen-
tive systems. Indeed, attempts to produce cost-minimizing solutions by
fiat will actually be less efficient than permitting physicians to do what
they want. If this is the case, there is relatively little that can be done
at a policy level.
The second possible reason is that consumers have differential infor-
mation. They know what going rates are for physicians' services, but
they are unaware of differences among physicians with regard to the
prices or quantities of other health care inputs they prescribe. Then a
physician who substitutes, say, a cheaper but therapeutically equivalent
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so by charging slightly more for his own services. For if he raises his
price, even though the total cost to the consumer of his method of treat-
ment is less, he will lose customers.
If this assumption about differential information is correct, the analy-
sis offers a new perspective on the difference between prepaid group
practice or health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and fee-for-ser-
vice. It suggests that one advantage of HMOs, and of competition among
HMOs, is that they can make information on the total cost of treatment
available to consumers.
Another implication is that current legal proceedings to remove med-
ical ethical bans on advertising would have the largest potential benefit
not from the information that could be provided on the prices different
physicians charge for their own services, but rather from the informa-
tion that competing physicians might find it worthwhile to provide on
the quantities and prices of other services they typically use. Existing
empirical work on the effect of permitting advertising has been confined
to a profession (optometry) where the quantity of prescribed services
provided by others is small relative to the professional's charge.
1 In
medicine, where hospital and prescription drug bills combined far ex-
ceed physician charges, both the benefits from permitting advertising
and the content of that advertising might be expected to be much differ-
ent. This is especially likely to be true for hospital-oriented specialties.
A final important implication of the analysis is that if physician fees
are fixed, as might occur under various forms of third party reimburse-
ment or under price controls, then much of the incentive to minimize
the cost of other inputs is lost. The physician can still attract customers
by offering them lower costs for other inputs, but he cannot gain from
this increased demand for his own services by raising his price. Only if
he were initially in a situation of excess supply, i.e., if he actually gained
from producing additional output at the current price, would he have
such an incentive. And even here the incentive would be less than would
be provided if he could both produce more output and get a higher price
for it.
Physicians have, in this analysis, an incentive to cost minimize given
the net prices of other inputs that they face. This solution will coincide
with minimization of social costs only if those net prices are equal to or
proportional to social opportunity cost. Even apart from the usual non-
competitive market distortions, I argued in chapter 2 that for one im-
portant class of inputs—hospital inputs—additional distortions may be
present. The individual physician may perceive the cost of hospital inputs
for his patients to be much less than real cost either because of typical
hospital insurance coverage or because of the inability of hospitals to
price all of their inputs at marginal cost. If physicians do behave in part
as the income maximizers described earlier, one would predict that hos-
pitals would provide too much hospital input relative to physician input.115 Conclusions and Policy Implications
The empirical results in chapter 3 strongly support this proposition. This
is in marked contrast to the results found by Reinhardt and others for
physician ambulatory practice, in which physicians used relatively too
few other inputs.
While these results are consistent with (apparent) cost minimization
or income maximization by physicians, they only point in the hypothe-
sized qualitative direction; they do not prove that all of the substitution
that would enhance physician incomes has gone on. But they do show
that input combinations of other inputs are sensitive to relative net
prices, as postulated by the theory. There are, of course, other ad hoc
explanations possible: physicians may be thought to be overly aware of
costs they must pay directly, such as costs of other inputs in their own
practices, and less aware of costs they cause their patients to incur else-
where. Physicians may not be well informed about gross hospital prices.
But if hospital insurance coverage is extensive, net hospital prices may
not vary enough to make it worthwhile for the physician to become
informed. On balance, these ad hoc explanations seem to be more de-
scriptive of the results of a maximization process such as that outlined
rather than genuinely competitive alternative models.
The Physician as Provider of Information
The second empirical study attempts to look at the effect of the infor-
mation physicians provide on demand for physician and other services.
With regard to an individual consumer's demand for physicians' own
services, the independent variables of interest are the number of physi-
cians per capita, the total or average demand in his market area, and
the gross price received by the physician. I argue that information for a
given patient is more likely to be distorted in the direction of increasing
the quantity demanded at a given price the smaller the average quantity
used per capita, the larger the number of physicians per capita, and the
higher the gross price. All of these changes are likely to increase the
gain by shifting demand. The first two also reduce physician income,
which is more likely to lead to a reduced level of accuracy.
The empirical results strongly support two propositions: (1) the avail-
ability effects observed for physicians' services come from alterations in
accuracy, not from any of the other hypothesized causes, but (2) ex-
cept for ambulatory care for low education persons in big cities, such
effects are of minor importance. For hospital care, the availability effects,
while not measured very precisely, and while not of major importance,
seem to come from a reduction in ease or speed of obtaining a hospital
bed. In particular, the amount of physician demand creation for expen-
sive types of medical care—hospital episodes and surgery—is small or
nonexistent. Past empirical work which has suggested important demand
creation effects for these services failed to account adequately for the116 Chapter Seven
health status of the patient or for differences in effects across types of
geographic areas.
There is, then, an availability effect; physicians can affect consumer
demand by what they tell consumers. And the effect is strongest pre-
cisely among those groups of consumers, those with little education or
information, for which one would expect it to be strongest. Overall,
however, the practical consequence of the availability effect is quite
small. In particular, where patients are more easily able to exchange
information about diagnostic accuracy, as perhaps in rural areas, little
availability effect can be detected. Either physicians do not generally
manipulate information in an effective way or, if they do, they do so to
approximately the same extent regardless of how many of them there
are in an area, and regardless of how busy they are.
The most obvious policy implication of the alternative theories of the
availability effect is implicit in what has already been said: if different
theories imply differential effects on different population groups, then
concern for the appropriateness of use can be directed to those groups
most likely to be affected. In the simplest case, where a policy decision
about what is regarded as appropriate use has already been made, the
theories have different implications about the kinds of people whose use
is likely to be affected by availability. Under one theory, availability will
affect most strongly those people with what physicians regard as unde-
serving conditions (whether because they are trivial or because they are
uninteresting); under another, it would be those with higher opportunity
cost of time; under still another, those with least information or experi-
ence. The confirmation of the information-manipulation theory provides
suggestions for the design of corrective measures. For instance, the re-
sults in chapter 5 suggest that direct programs to determine the appro-
priateness of use, such as PSROs, would be most useful for those persons
whose use might most be expected to be affected by availability—per-
sons in high producer price areas, persons who are less well educated,
and persons with chronic conditions. Of perhaps equal importance is the
suggestion in the information manipulation theory that estimates of the
partial effect of price on use may be biased downward unless the accu-
racy of information is controlled for. This qualification is most relevant
when insurance coverage is sufficiently low that prices received by pro-
ducers are approximately equal to prices paid by consumers, as in the
case of ambulatory care. The policy implications of changing user prices,
e.g., by reducing insurance coverage, while leaving producer prices con-
stant, are also important. The intent of an increase in user price to
reduce use and cost may be frustrated if physicians manipulate informa-
tion to counteract the effect of reduced use on their own incomes.
Where appropriateness of use has not been determined a priori, and
where the changes in resource availability are to be evaluated in terms117 Conclusions and Policy Implications
of their effect on use, analysis becomes more complex. The value of use
of medical care to the receiver is measured, at the margin, by the price
he would be willing to pay if he were appropriately informed.
2 In the
case in which time prices are altered by changes in physician availabil-
ity, a measure of the time price would provide an estimate of the value
of additional use, if any exists. But in the excess demand or information
manipulation cases, results are not as clear-cut. In the excess demand
case, we know that the value of use is at least as great as the price, but
that is all. But in the case of information manipulation, even this bench-
mark is gone. Where manipulation is present, all of the presumptions
about the desirability of market results is lost. This makes it especially
important to circumscribe those areas: the results in chapters 5 and 6
suggest that they are much more limited than is often suggested.
Finally, if it continues to be confirmed for certain parts of the popu-
lation, the information manipulation theory can suggest a tool for public
policy which has not been much used up to the present: the provision,
at public expense, of accurate information to these population groups.
This information would have two possible forms, not only more accurate
information about the usefulness or, equally, the uselessness of kinds of
care physicians suggest, from hypertension therapy to tonsillectomies
and hysterectomies, but also information on the accuracy of advice of
particular physicians. PSROs should generate this kind of information
in any case; it might, however, be most effectively utilized if communi-
cated to consumers. Here again, the kind of information to be col-
lected, the kinds of consumers to whom it should be provided, and
the geographic areas of most concern could be determined by empirical
analysis.
Economic Models of Physician Behavior
The most general message of this set of studies is that we should not
be too quick to depart from standard maximizing economic models in
attempting to explain behavior in the medical care industry. Supposedly
anomalous features of that industry sometimes vanish when more ap-
propriate sets of data are used, while other apparent institutional differ-
ences require only redefinitions of price, ownership-entrepreneurship,
and markets to make models analogous to the traditional ones appli-
cable.
This is not to deny that there are not some peculiar features of this
industry, nor that expansion of producer and consumer utility functions
may be necessary in order to explain behavior. But it does suggest that
adaptations of standard economic models may be the most fruitful way
of approaching these problems.